

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 PARIS 14895 01 OF 02 191852Z

45

ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 /031 W

----- 081211

P 191801Z JUN 74

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0072

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY ROME

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

USMISSION NATO

USMISSION GENEVA

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 14895

EXDIS

OTTAWA FOR THE SECRETARY'S PARTY

GENEVA FOR CSCE DEL

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, US, UR, FR

SUBJECT: COORDINATION OF OUR CSCE POLICY

REF: PARIS 13555

1. SUMMARY. IN REFTEL, WE RECOMMENDED A SPECIAL EFFORT TO COORDINATE OUR CSCE POLICY WITH FRANCE AND THE OTHER ALLIES, NOTING THAT SUSPICIONS OF US-SOVIET COLLUSION WERE BOUND TO RISE WITH THE APPROACH OF THE MOSCOW SUMMIT. WHILE OUR CONSULTATION IN THE NATO FRAMEWORK, BOTH AT BRUSSELS AND AT GENEVA, HAS BEEN HELPFUL IN MITIGATING THESE ANXIETIES, RECENT CONVERSATIONS HERE SHOW THEIR PERSISTENCE. WE ACCORDINGLY RECOMMEND THAT THE PRESIDENT DEVOTE SPECIAL ATTENTION TO THE CSCE DURING HIS VISIT TO USNATO,

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 PARIS 14895 01 OF 02 191852Z

REASSURING THE ALLIES THAT HE WILL TREAT WITH BREZHNEV

ON THE BASIS OF NATO POSITIONS AGREED TO AT OTTAWA.
END SUMMARY.

2. CHIEF OF FRENCH WORKING GROUP ON CSCE, PIERRET, WHO HAD JUST RETURNED FROM GENEVA, TOLD US JUNE 18 THAT THE CORRIDORS ARE BUZZING THERE WITH SPECULATION OVER THE PRESIDENT'S FORTHCOMING ENCOUNTER WITH BREZHNEV. HE SAID THERE WAS A GENERAL EXPECTATION THAT BREZHNEV WOULD PUT CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE ON THE PRESIDENT FOR AN EARLY END TO THE CONFERENCE AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL WITHOUT APPRECIABLE SOVIET CONCESSIONS ON HUMAN CONTACTS ISSUES, AND THERE WAS CONCERN THAT THE PRESIDENT MIGHT YIELD TO BREZHNEV'S ENTREATIES IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN MOMENTUM IN US-SOVIET RELATIONS. IN A RELATED CONVERSATION WITH EMBOFF LE MONDE SENIOR FOREIGN EDITOR MICHEL TATU SAID HE BELIEVES THERE WILL BE AN OVERWHELMING TEMPTATION FOR THE PRESIDENT TO YIELD TO BREZHNEV ON CSCE ISSUES WHICH APPEAR OF RELATIVELY SMALL IMPORTANCE TO THE US, IN RETURN FOR SOVIET CONCESSIONS ON MATTERS WHICH ARE OF GREATER CONCERN TO US.

3. AS WE POINTED OUT IN REFTTEL, OUR POSITION ON CSCE ISSUES IS BASICALLY IN ACCORD WITH THAT OF FRANCE, ESPECIALLY NOW SINCE WE HAVE ACCEPTED THE PROPOSAL FOR A MEDITERRANEAN DECLARATION. ACCORDING TO PIERRET, THE FRENCH HAVE NO PROBLEM WITH OUR NEGATIVE POSITION ON MILITARY MOVEMENTS AS A CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURE AND THEY SHARE OUR RETICENCE ON FOLLOW-ON ARRANGEMENTS. HOWEVER, THEY BELIEVE THAT, HAVING UNDERTAKEN THE CSCE,

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 PARIS 14895 02 OF 02 191851Z

45

ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 /031 W

----- 081218

P 191801Z JUN 74

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0073

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY ROME
USMISSION EC BRUSSELS
USMISSION NATO
USMISSION GENEVA

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 14895

EXDIS

WE SHOULD GET SOMETHING POSITIVE OUT OF IT, WHICH IN THEIR VIEW SHOULD BE SOVIET CONCESSIONS ON HUMAN CONTACTS. THEY ACCORDINGLY BELIEVE WE SHOULD STAND FIRM IN HOLDING OUT FOR SOVIET MOVEMENT IN THIS AREA. THE FRENCH WOULD WELCOME BRINGING THE CONFERENCE TO A SPEEDY CONCLUSION, BUT ARE PREPARED TO STAND FIRM AGAINST THE SOVIETS. SPEAKING PERSONALLY, PIERRET THOUGHT THE FRENCH WOULD BE WILLING TO WORK INTO AUGUST IF SOME SOVIET MOVEMENT WAS SHOWN BY MID-JULY. OTHERWISE, THEY WOULD PROBABLY OPT FOR ADJOURNMENT UNTIL OCTOBER.

4. IN ALL OUR CONVERSATIONS HERE, WE HAVE OF COURSE STRESSED OUR EFFORTS TO COORDINATE CSCE POLICY AND HAVE SOUGHT IN STRONG TERMS TO REASSURE THE FRENCH THAT WE INTEND TO WORK WITH THE ALLIES ON CSCE ISSUES. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THAT THIS REASSURANCE WOULD HAVE AN ESPECIALLY BENEFICIAL EFFECT JUST NOW IF IT CAME FROM THE TOP. THE PRESIDENT'S STOPOVER AT NATO WOULD SEEM TO PROVIDE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 PARIS 14895 02 OF 02 191851Z

AN EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY. AS WE POINTED OUT IN REFTTEL THE CSCE IN AND OF ITSELF SEEMS TO BE OF CONSIDERABLY MORE IMPORTANCE TO OUR ALLIES THAN IT IS TO US AND WE BELIEVE IT MERITS SPECIAL ATTENTION IN OUR EFFORTS TO CONVINCE THEM THAT WE CAN AND MUST WORK TOGETHER IN PURSUING DETENTE.
STONE

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: COLLECTIVE SECURITY, POLICIES, MEETING PROCEEDINGS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 19 JUN 1974
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974PARIS14895
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D740160-0279
From: PARIS
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740632/aaaabbbw.tel
Line Count: 160
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: PARIS 13555
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 03 APR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <03 APR 2002 by izenbei0>; APPROVED <18 JUN 2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: COORDINATION OF OUR CSCE POLICY
TAGS: PFOR, US, UR, FR, CSCE
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005